The “Early Exit” Trap for Start-ups in Türkiye

In Türkiye, ventures are leaving the table before reaching their potential peak. While exits may initially seem like successes, they bring significant losses. Experts explain the reasons behind Türkiye’s early exit reflex, its cost to the country, and possible solutions…

There is a reflex we almost “always” encounter in the Türkiye entrepreneurship ecosystem: Early exit. These exits (selling the venture), which appear as success stories at first glance, actually stem from a systemic necessity when examined more deeply. Because many ventures in Türkiye face the dilemma of “to grow or to sell” at a very early stage, long before reaching their full potential. This dilemma is often not a romantic entrepreneurial choice; it emerges as a rational but necessary decision made within the triangle of capital, time, and uncertainty.

Limited late-stage investment resources, scaling difficulties in accessing global markets, and macroeconomic uncertainties push entrepreneurs to guarantee gains rather than magnify risks. While uncertainty and concerns about capital continuity come to the fore for the entrepreneur, the pressure regarding the return period of funds is decisive for the investor. A large portion of venture capital funds in Türkiye are relatively small-scale and structured to provide returns to their investors within an average of 8-10 years. This structure creates an invisible but powerful time pressure on ventures.

When we look at global ecosystems, we see a completely different perception of time. In the United States, the United Kingdom, South Korea, or Israel, the exit journey of a technology venture often takes 12-15 years. This period allows companies not only to grow but also to become industry leaders and even strengthen their independence through an IPO. It is no coincidence that some of the world’s most valuable technology companies are still led by their founders. Examples like Meta, Nvidia, NC Soft, Netmarble, and Tencent clearly show how patient capital and long-term vision create global giants. Many of these companies, despite early acquisition offers, preferred to grow, go public, and remain within the ecosystem.

NO GROWTH INVESTMENTS

In Türkiye, however, the picture is very fragile. As indicated by Startup.watch and similar ecosystem reports, companies in Türkiye show a very fertile structure at the initial stage. New ideas, new teams, and new ventures sprout quickly. But there are no follow-on investments to turn these sprouts into giant oaks. The fact that not a single late-stage investment was recorded in 2025 reports also demonstrates this situation. Either slowly wither due to lack of capital, or leave the table profitably while still shining. At this point, selling – in entrepreneurial jargon, exiting – is often seen as the most rational option.

How valuation expectations have evolved globally in the last 10 years should also be read within this framework. While “becoming a unicorn” was once seen as the peak, the increase in the number of private companies reaching valuations of $10 billion and above today has also scaled up the concept of exit. The capital abundance created by the long-term low-interest environment made it possible for ventures to remain independent for longer periods and scale. In Türkiye, however, early exit often stems not from a lack of vision, but as a natural consequence of the capital climate.

Moreover, global geopolitical tensions, asymmetric wars, and economic fluctuations are added to this picture. While an entrepreneur in Türkiye tries to compete with a rival that has received hundreds of millions of dollars in fuel from Silicon Valley, they also have to struggle with currency risk, access to finance, and uncertainty at the same time. In these conditions, although early exit is applauded as an individual success story, from the ecosystem’s perspective, what is lost is not just a company, but a potential that could have a say on a global scale. The ecosystem has to start from scratch each time, and memory loss means we collectively waste our efforts. Acquired ventures are often cast aside without being grown.

We have put on the table why ventures in Türkiye exit early, why they cannot grow by remaining independent for longer, and how this problem can be tackled…

Barış ÖZİSTEK / CEO of Boğaziçi Ventures

“The solution is to facilitate the public offering of technology companies”

Looking at the global technical definition, individuals with net assets over $30 million are defined as “Super Rich.” Today, an entrepreneur owning 60% of a venture valued at $50 million enters this category as soon as they sell their company. I don’t know many people who would refuse the chance to have $30 million, especially when they don’t even have up to $100,000 cash in the bank. One of the most realistic solutions to early exits is funds that make secondary investments. The Sinerji Fund within BV Portföy is the best example of this. The success of companies like Google, Apple, and Nvidia today is not just about them reaching huge market values alone. They have access to such immense resources that they can make investments that normal companies, or even states, cannot. At the foundation of technological development lies the capacity, ambition, and desire of such large companies to invest in the future with the great wealth they create. One way to prevent early exits is to facilitate the public offering of technology companies. When we look at ecosystems like America, Korea, and England, we see many publicly traded technology companies. Today, founders are still at the helm of giant companies. Meta, Nvidia, NC Soft, Netmarble, Tencent are very good examples. Public offering provides an exit opportunity for investors, which is very critical for the sustainability of the investment world.

TÜRKİYE IS A STRONG TEST MARKET, SO VENTURES MATURE QUICKLY

According to Ali Karabey, Co-founder of 212, the most fundamental reason for early exit in Türkiye is that after ventures reach a certain point, two paths appear before them: either to scale up with a serious globalization investment, or to join forces with a strategic buyer to create value faster. Especially acquisitions in terms of technology, team, and customer access can become the next growth step for some ventures. Furthermore, in a period when the exit environment hasn’t fully expanded yet, the timing of capturing the right buyer interest is seen as an opportunity for high value.

In this equation, behind early exit, there is generally pragmatic optimization. The founder, investor, and company are all trying to capture the best value simultaneously. For the founder, early exit can mean not just money, but also distribution channels, global customers, operational power, and the product scaling on a larger platform. For the investor, it’s a healthy mechanism that runs the fund cycle and paves the way for new investments. On the market side, in some verticals, because Türkiye is a strong test market, ventures mature quickly and can get on the radar of strategic buyers. So, early exit is often chosen not because it couldn’t grow, but to do the next phase of growth with a strategic partner.

NOT AN ESCAPE, BUT RISK MANAGEMENT

According to the Startups.watch 2025 Türkiye Venture Ecosystem report; the exit environment is not strong and opportunities are not increasing. Therefore, Karabey, emphasizing that a significant portion of early exits are observed not as an escape, but as a risk management decision in a market with high uncertainty, says, “However, in some cases, early exit can turn into an escape. For example; the company leaning towards selling just out of fear of uncertainty when it has a chance for global leadership. In contrast, an exit made to the right strategic buyer, with the right valuation and the right justification, is a clear success. Not every acquisition is made to grow the target company. Some buyers buy the product or technology and integrate it into their own system. Some primarily aim to acquire talent, buying the team along with the company. Therefore, the logic of the acquisition and the post-acquisition fate of the venture vary significantly depending on the buyer’s intent.”

IT BRINGS NOT JUST MONEY, BUT ALSO ROLE MODELS

Karabey, also mentioning that exiting contributes to the ecosystem besides providing capital to the founder, states: “Actually, the most valuable part of the exit begins here. Exit brings not just money to the ecosystem; it brings role models, experience, network, and new investor behavior. Founders investing in new companies, teams starting new ventures, the spread of know-how, and an increase in bolder experiments amplify the ecosystem effect of exits. Therefore, an exit is not just a liquidity step; it’s a mechanism that keeps the ecosystem’s wheels turning. Companies that should not exit early are generally those that have a clear counterpart in the global market, can play for category leadership, and whose value generation accelerates as they scale. Especially for ventures that have achieved product-market fit, established a repeatable sales structure, and have healthy unit economics, an early sale can often mean the potential is closed before it’s fully opened.”

Gözdenur AKAR / CEO of Onicorn Technology and Angel Investor

“The number of truly strategic exits is low”

Growth capital is insufficient in Türkiye. Financing after Series B-C is almost non-existent. The domestic market is limited, and globalization is both costly and difficult regulation-wise. In these conditions, early exit is often the most rational scenario for the entrepreneur. In Türkiye, the entrepreneur’s vision is long but their capital is short, the investor’s fund duration is limited and IRR pressure is high, the market saturates quickly, and scaling requires global capital. When this structure persists, the natural result is early exit. In Türkiye, there are mostly exits made due to lack of capital; this falls into the escape category. The number of truly strategic exits is low. Early exits also have long-term costs for the ecosystem. Because the ecosystem cannot accumulate companies, the culture of product, technology, and human resources resets every time. Therefore, Türkiye struggles to grow large companies. Liquidity is provided, but capacity is lost. Acquirers often cannot grow the ventures either. Speed, culture, and innovation are lost in integrations. A significant portion of ventures acquired by large corporations become productized but do not scale. We have seen many examples of this in banks, telecoms, and holding companies.

Volkan OKUTAN / Business Development and Coordination Manager at Entertech VC

“If economic uncertainty is high, the entrepreneur can be opportunity-focused”

For some ventures and entrepreneurial teams, an exit occurring within a few years may not be early, but a rational decision made at the right time. However, Türkiye’s socio-economic structure is an important factor feeding this perception. In an environment where economic uncertainties are high and conditions can change rapidly, both entrepreneurs and investors can be inclined to make shorter-term and opportunity-focused decisions. In an environment with limited predictability, a captured valuation or strategic exit opportunity may be quickly evaluated with the thought “the future might be uncertain.” Therefore, early exit, in many cases, can be shaped by the reflex to realize current value at the right time, rather than giving up on potential. Early exit cannot be defined solely as an absolute success or a direct escape. The success of an exit emerges from the holistic evaluation of the company’s stage, market conditions, and the strategic decisions made. In the fast-paced and highly competitive environment where technology-producing startups operate, the balance between scaling and exit is not always clear, and this balance is often determined by timing, resources, and economic realities.

EARLY EXITS CAUSE THE ECOSYSTEM TO “RESET”

According to Prof. Dr. Attila Dikbaş, General Manager of ITU ARI Teknokent, most venture capital funds in Türkiye are relatively small-scale and structured to provide returns to their investors within an average of 8-10 years. This creates a natural time pressure on ventures. In Series A and subsequent rounds, finding investment, especially from outside Türkiye, becomes mandatory. However, this process is quite challenging for ventures struggling to scale globally. Additionally, the limited number of domestic investors, the scarcity of strategic buyer alternatives, and macroeconomic uncertainties lead entrepreneurs to view incoming exit offers more positively.

Pointing out that the early exit decision is related not only to economic factors but also to a psychological balance, Dikbaş says, “For the entrepreneur, managing global operations means capital needs, organizational transformation, and high stress. This burden may not be sustainable for every entrepreneur. On the investor side, fund durations, return pressure, and the reflex not to miss opportunities arising in periods of accelerated competition make early exit logical. As far as we observe at ITU ARI Teknokent; many entrepreneurs may prefer to continue with a financially meaningful offer rather than the operational burden.”

Dikbaş, stating that if a venture has the potential for global growth and investment, early exit would be a long-term opportunity loss, adds, “However, for a venture that cannot scale in the global market despite all efforts and has limited investment alternatives, early exit can be a rational strategy.”

Hüseyin OĞUZ / Startup Investment Consultant

“Not early success, but an incomplete scaling process”

The main reason for the early sale of startups in Türkiye is not “early success,” but the incomplete scaling process. Many ventures get their product working, find customers, and even start generating revenue; but they cannot reach the capital layer needed to finance global growth.

Early sales often happen at this point: The company is not yet a category leader, controls a small portion of the market, but its technology or customer base becomes meaningful for a strategic buyer. So, the issue is not “the company was sold because it was doing very well”; it was sold because it became clear it couldn’t go further. From the entrepreneur’s perspective, the product works, but the capital needed for growth is absent.

Global competitors are running faster. At this point, selling the company ends a period of uncertainty that could potentially last for years with a single decision. From the investor’s perspective, IPOs are almost non-existent in Türkiye. The funds to bring the next round are also limited. Therefore, instead of taking the risk that “a better exit may never come” and waiting, the investor may prefer an early but certain exit. Most early-sold companies are too niche, too small, or geographically limited to grow independently on a global scale. Therefore, early sale is not the ideal scenario but becomes a rational equilibrium point under the current conditions.

Frequent early exits cause the ecosystem to reset. Ventures withdraw from the stage without gaining crucial experiences like global growth, organizational scaling, and international competition. This leads to both limited accumulation of knowledge and new ventures repeating similar mistakes. For big success stories to emerge, some ventures must play the long game. Only then can the ecosystem level up,” he says.

According to Dikbaş, exits also have a contribution. Entrepreneurs who exit return to the ecosystem with the capital they gain. They provide knowledge and financial resources as angel investors or fund founders. Erdem Yurdanur, the founder of Maçkolik, and Barbaros Özbüğüt, co-founder of Iyzico, have made significant contributions in this regard in Türkiye. Such examples are quite valuable for the sustainability of the ecosystem.

SOMETIMES THE MOVIE ENDS BEFORE THE SECOND ACT OF A BEAUTIFUL STORY IS WRITTEN

According to information provided by Emre Dilber, Director of Ünlü Ventures, looking back, expectations regarding the scales and valuations of venture companies have evolved significantly in the last 10 years. While “becoming a unicorn” was once the peak for entrepreneurs, the number of private venture companies reaching valuations of $10 billion in the global arena has increased so much that exiting as a unicorn has even started to be considered early in some sectors. There is a clear periodic reality behind this. Years of low-interest environment created a serious capital surplus in the market. This capital facilitated access to long-term financing to fuel the growth appetite of venture companies and allowed many ventures to remain independent and scale for longer periods. Pointing out that the picture is more challenging on the Türkiye side, Dilber says, “I think the early exit of startups in Türkiye is often not a choice, but a natural consequence of the capital climate. The theoretical ideal scenario is clear: The founder stays at the helm of the company, holds a meaningful stake, the company scales in global markets, and at some point, thanks to cash generation and access to finance, it transforms into a self-sufficient structure. However, this path requires the company to receive strong follow-on capital at every stage. A significant part of the examples in Türkiye that manage not to have to exit early open up abroad very early on and quickly establish the structure to access pools where growth capital is abundant. Because both growth and survival are only possible with liquidity.”

Emphasizing that there is strong movement at the seed stage in Türkiye, but the middle part of the story remains quite weak, Dilber explains, “I describe this as ‘the plane takes off, but often lacks the fuel to gain altitude.’ In 2025, Türkiye again maintained its character of ‘abundant early-stage investment, few follow-on rounds.’ While transition rates from seed to the next stage hover around 50% in developed markets, this rate remains around 13% in Türkiye. In other words, just as companies are about to grow, the ecosystem runs out of oxygen.”

According to Dilber, funds, due to the investment cycle, want to see a liquidity event at some point. Consequently, only a few companies that can globalize and access growth capital can remain independent for the long term and wait for the right time. The majority, unable to access sufficient liquidity and remain independent in Türkiye, turn to sale without fully realizing their potential. That’s why, sometimes with us, the movie ends before the second act of a beautiful story is written. Dilber states, “Türkiye’s need is to strengthen the intermediate capital layer, as much as seed investment, and increase follow-on investment capacity. The way to reduce early exit in Türkiye is to provide the entrepreneur with the fuel to go the distance.”

EARLY EXIT IS A RATIONAL RESULT

According to Dilber, who says, “In markets with limited access to capital like Türkiye, early exit is generally a success because many alternatives are failures. If a company cannot reach the next level with its own cash flow or accessible finance, early exit is not giving up on potential, but preserving current value,” especially in an environment with limited secondary markets, if the founder has no option to access meaningful liquidity, early exit becomes a rational result. For growth-oriented business models, sustainability depends on strong finance. For companies with access to international investors, that have established an operationally scalable structure and can finance growth, early exit means disposing of the potential before reaching its full value. The focus of ventures in this group should be on creating larger and more successful exits by scaling. The problem is that the number of companies in Türkiye falling into this group of strong sustainable growth and strong finance is still limited.

THERE IS A RISK OF THE ECOSYSTEM CONSTANTLY RESETTING

Also emphasizing that early exit carries a risk of the ecosystem constantly resetting in the long term, Dilber says, “Because a structure that predominantly produces early exits will naturally struggle to produce large and independent technology companies. However, reading the issue only as ‘there are too many early exits’ here would be misleading. The real problem is an ecosystem architecture that cannot create late-stage companies. In other words, the lower rungs of the growth ladder exist, but because the upper rungs cannot be built sufficiently, companies naturally exit the game at an earlier stage. Therefore, early exit often appears not as a choice of the ecosystem, but as a structural result.”

Despite this, Dilber claims Türkiye has a significant advantage: “A large portion of entrepreneurs who make early exits do not break away from the ecosystem. On the contrary, these entrepreneurs turn into angel investors, take part in the establishment of new funds, and bring not only capital but also experience, network, and confidence to new ventures. The emergence of new companies in the same sector post-exit, especially in verticals like gaming, fintech, and SaaS, teams splitting to start new ventures, and the formation of specific clusters are concrete indicators of this. From this perspective, an exit is not just an end providing cash to the founder, but when interpreted correctly, it’s the ecosystem’s self-feeding mechanism.”

FUNDS’ PRESSURE TO CREATE SHORT-TERM LIQUIDITY IS ALSO A REASON FOR EARLY EXITS

Mustafa Keçeli, Fund Manager at APY Ventures, also emphasizes that there is no single reason behind the early exit of ventures in Türkiye: “There is a combination of structural and behavioral factors. One of the most fundamental reasons is the limited depth of capital. Domestic capital to finance growth after Series A is still not strong enough, and foreign capital has been more cautious in recent years. In this environment, the entrepreneur may see a reasonable acquisition offer as a safe harbor, instead of living with the uncertainty of ‘can I make it to the next round?’ In addition, especially in regulation-intensive areas like fintech, licensing processes, compliance costs, and time loss slow down scaling. This pressure wears down the entrepreneur and can make early exit a rational choice.”

Pointing out that early exit can be a move that eliminates personal risks for a team progressing through years of uncertainty, Keçeli says, “Besides this, the fact that a significant portion of entrepreneurs in Türkiye lack a sufficiently developed global perspective also triggers the early exit decision. This situation often stems from the social circle remaining local, lack of foreign language skills, and fears, especially about entering markets like America. Entrepreneurs who are ‘stunned’ when entering the global commercial environment can struggle to adapt to the global market. On the investor side, fund durations are decisive. The pressure on funds to create liquidity within a certain timeframe can encourage earlier exits rather than long-term scaling stories.”

PRODUCT ERODES OVER TIME, BRAND DISAPPEARS

Regarding the scaling and market side, according to Keçeli, who highlights a critical issue specific to Türkiye, the technology and startup acquisition processes of both the public sector and especially large corporations progress very slowly. This slowness prevents ventures from becoming dominant quickly in the domestic market. Ventures that cannot gain a strong position locally also encounter barriers when expanding abroad and therefore struggle to reach high valuations. Additionally, the issue of global hiring seriously scares entrepreneurs from Türkiye. The hesitation in attracting talent from abroad creates a negative perception in the eyes of foreign investors and makes growth capital more difficult and expensive to obtain.

Some institutions acquire the venture to truly grow it, open new markets, develop its product, and strengthen its team. “But we don’t see such examples very often in Türkiye,” says Keçeli. “Looking at the overall picture, the vast majority of exits in Türkiye are on a smaller scale. In some acquisitions, the aim remains limited to merely absorbing the technology or the team. The product erodes over time, the venture’s brand disappears. In this scenario, we can say an exit happened, but value creation did not continue. That’s why, as investors, we particularly care about the question ‘who is buying and why?’ when an exit possibility is discussed.”

Emphasizing that if a company has a product that can grow globally, a strong team, and a position that can overcome regulatory and market barriers, it should not exit early just because “a good offer came,” Keçeli concludes his words as follows: “I believe that companies, especially those producing infrastructure, deeply embedded in the corporate market, with a repeatable sales model, should think longer-term. Such companies have the potential to be the locomotive of the ecosystem, rather than being sold. Exit should be a result, not a goal. If the only strategy is exit, then we will struggle to create big stories.”

Duygu EREN / CEO of Decacorn Angels

“The Turkish market is not sufficient for scaling in most verticals”

The main reason for early exit in Türkiye is the structural inadequacy of Series A, B, and subsequent capital to grow companies. Even if founders achieve product-market fit, they cannot find the capital to finance the next growth phase in time. This pushes them either to move the company abroad or to manage risk with an early strategic sale. For the entrepreneur, it’s about survival and sustainability. When access to growth finance becomes uncertain, preserving the value created today becomes rational instead of taking risks for another 2-3 years. On the investor side, limited follow-on capacity directs funds towards earlier realization. On the market and scaling side, Türkiye alone not being sufficient for unicorn scale in most verticals encourages companies to merge with global players. If the team disperses after the exit, technology goes abroad, and the founder does not return to the ecosystem, this risk is very serious. But well-structured exits bring founders and early employees back to the ecosystem as new investors and new founders. The differentiating point is whether the capital and knowledge generated post-exit remain within the system. Platforms with strong network effects, deep tech and IP-intensive businesses, companies accumulating long-term value in regulated sectors, and B2B companies with high capital efficiency are the types of companies that lose the most value in early exit. These companies should push more for independent growth when the right capital environment is created.

Gizem YAĞIZ / Managing Partner at 212 NexT

“Every early exit is the premature closing of a potential school”

The number of companies in Türkiye that have reached a valuation over $1 billion and remained independent is limited. This leads to insufficient accumulation of experience in late-stage company management, building global organizations, and scaled growth within the ecosystem. Every early exit means the premature closing of a potential “big company school.” This makes it difficult for the ecosystem to deepen. On the other hand, it’s not right to say that early exits have a completely negative impact. We see that some founders who exit become entrepreneurs again or return to the ecosystem as angel investors. In Türkiye, early exit is often not due to the short-term approach of entrepreneurs. Among the many factors influencing this decision, the simultaneous activation of finance, macroeconomic, and geographical risks before the product scales plays a significant role. Growing products globally by financing them steadily for several years requires a different equation. For these reasons, a reasonable offer from a strategic buyer can, in some cases, be evaluated as a more rational option than “waiting and growing.”

THE DEPTH OF CAPITAL MARKETS IN TÜRKİYE IS SHALLOW

According to Ahmet Başar, Co-Chair of the Entrepreneurship Working Group at the Young Executives and Businesspeople Association (GYİAD), although the start-up ecosystem in Türkiye has shown a lively appearance in terms of investment numbers and acquisition transactions in recent years, this picture should not be read one-dimensionally. While the spread of early-stage investments increases the number of ventures, structural difficulties in accessing capital during the growth phase (especially in the transition from seed to Series A/B) make early exit a strategic option for many ventures. Pointing out that the depth of capital markets in Türkiye is limited compared to Western countries, Başar says, “Therefore, when an entrepreneur reaches a certain scale, two options usually appear before them: To go for a larger and riskier capital round for global competition, or to evaluate the acquisition offer on the table. Considering the macroeconomic volatility and uncertainty environment, for many entrepreneurs, early exit is seen not as a lack of vision, but as a rational risk management tool. As revealed by Startup.watch and similar ecosystem reports, while Türkiye appears relatively strong at the seed/pre-seed stage, the number of Series A and B funds is quite limited. This creates a structure where ventures can find initial investment but struggle in the second and third rounds needed for scaling. At this point, sale often becomes the most rational alternative.”

Ahmet İstif, Co-Chair of the GYİAD Entrepreneurship Working Group, stating that it would be healthier to evaluate early exit based on push and pull factors rather than squeezing it into a single category of “success” or “escape,” shares the following:

“An exit occurring when a venture growing with strong metrics receives an offer from a strategic buyer that will create a platform effect is a scenario closer to success. In such exits, the venture gains the potential to scale faster with the buyer’s technology, distribution, and financial power. Continuously giving early exits harbors the risk of the ecosystem not being able to transition ‘from seed to tree.’ Every sale returns capital to the ecosystem; but if strategic knowledge and decision-making power are transferred abroad, Türkiye may remain only a center of talented founders. In the long term, the goal should be not just to create sellable companies, but to create structures that are too valuable to sell and can compete on a global scale.”

Barış Konca, Co-Chair of the GYİAD Entrepreneurship Working Group, also draws attention to the fact that post-acquisition success depends on the buyer’s growth intent, integration plan, and the ability to preserve the venture’s agile spirit, stating, “In acquisitions made with a platform and ecosystem approach, when technology and distribution synergy is established correctly, it can set an example. However, in traditional and bureaucratic structures, ventures can often lose their innovation capabilities and turn into a cumbersome department. Therefore, acquisition alone is not a guarantee of growth; it’s a matter of vision, integration, and people management. Exit does not only mean financial gain for the founder. Successful exits enable experienced founders to return to the ecosystem as angel investors, increase foreign investor confidence, and allow teams trained in that venture to spread knowledge and culture by establishing new companies. From this perspective, well-structured exits are important levers that accelerate the learning and capital cycle of the ecosystem. For companies providing strategic infrastructure, having strong cash flow, and the potential to change the rules of the game in their sector, early exit may not always be the right choice. Such structures should aim for long-term value creation and permanence on a global scale rather than short-term financial gain.”

MANY EXITS ARE A RISK MITIGATION DECISION IMPOSED BY MARKET STRUCTURE

According to Sanem Oktar, Chair of the Entrepreneurs’ Organization (EO) Türkiye Board, growth and sustainability require not only capital but also a good team, a developing market, and a supportive tax system. Türkiye, with its still high inflation, is an obstacle for start-ups in this sense. Foreign fund interest is much more selective compared to previous years. Looking at the macro conditions, “interest rates” are still high. So cash is valuable. Instead of large investments, investing in many small start-ups is preferred. “I think early exit is not a choice but a result of the current conditions,” says Oktar. “I believe that if suitable conditions are provided, teams and companies established with great difficulty will continue their scaling strategies. Also, for the Türkiye economy, our main goal should be to create growing companies that can compete globally. And I believe this will be possible with ventures led by their founders.”

Emphasizing that today early exit is a risk management tool for the entrepreneur, according to Oktar, they want to get a return on their effort, grow, and move to the next stage in the market. High interest rates and prolonged funding costs increase the pressure to “secure the next round.” When growth capital is scarce, the entrepreneur aims to reach cash at an earlier stage. They are essentially trying to survive. Because globalization, team building, and marketing are issues that require investment. The investor also wants a quick return; when the cost of money is high, they want to make a small but quick profit in the short term. For the company, it becomes a tool to overcome the cost of globalization with a “strategic partner.”

Türkiye is a strong test market for developing products and services, but scale is needed to compete globally. In this sense, the Turkish market remains too small. Stating that early exit is success in some cases and a rational escape from a capital gap in others, Oktar concludes her words as follows: “If you created value with a good multiplier, are opening up to the world with the right partnership, or gaining a competitive advantage, if the company or product is globalizing, if the team and technology can scale, then early exit is a success. But if the only motivation is that the founder got tired and the money ran out, it’s not possible to talk about success. However, let me also add that due to the capital scarcity or lack of A/B series investments in Türkiye, many exits can actually be risk mitigation decisions imposed by the market structure.

Excessive early exit can push the ecosystem to the ‘constant start line’; because fewer large and globally scaled companies/brands emerge. But well-designed exits also nourish the ecosystem. Türkiye’s capacity to give birth to large companies weakens. Honestly, I believe that the main motivation of company founders is to work with passion, courage, and tirelessly to realize their dreams as much as for money. In this case, I believe that the real important thing is to ensure these founders remain in company management by providing them with suitable conditions, supporting their missing skills with capital and business management knowledge. This will be beneficial not only for them but also for Türkiye’s ecosystem.”

Dr. Önder KUL / General Manager of BTM

“Depth does not form in a game where you constantly return to the start”

Limited late-stage investment resources and scaling difficulties in accessing global markets bring entrepreneurs early into the “to grow or to sell” dilemma. At this point, many entrepreneurs prefer to guarantee gains rather than magnify risks. On the entrepreneur side, uncertainty and concern about capital continuity are decisive; on the investor side, the pressure regarding the fund’s return period is decisive. A significant portion of investors in Türkiye still prioritize creating liquidity at an early stage. On the scaling side, global sales, regulation, and human resource issues trigger the exit decision before the venture can fully realize its potential. An exit made to the right strategic buyer with the right valuation is a success. However, exits made solely to escape uncertainty when there is potential for growth limit both the entrepreneur and the ecosystem in the long run. The meaning of an exit is determined by the intention and timing behind it. It becomes difficult for an ecosystem that constantly makes early exits to produce large companies. Know-how, leadership, and global competition experience do not accumulate internally. Every exit is a new beginning, but depth does not form in a game where you constantly return to the start.

A STRATEGIC BREATHLESSNESS

According to Betül Kübra Ekinci, Deputy General Manager of the Türkiye Artificial Intelligence Initiative (TRAI), if we were to summarize this situation with a single concept; we could call it “strategic breathlessness.” But behind this breathlessness lies a multi-layered equation involving both local obligations and a large gravitational field created by corporate demand. First, we face a financial glass ceiling that is difficult to overcome. Türkiye is a very fertile ecosystem at the seed stage; sprouts are rising everywhere. But we are experiencing a serious drought in “late-stage” (Series C and beyond) investments that would turn these sprouts into giant oaks. The fact that not a single late-stage investment was recorded in 2025 reports brings the entrepreneur to a crossroads: Either slowly wither from lack of capital, or leave the table profitably while still shining.

The second and perhaps most decisive factor, Ekinci mentions, is the aggressive appetite on the “buyer” side of the market. “2025 data shows that Corporate Venture Capital (CVC) participation has reached a record level of 33%. Large holdings and corporations prefer to grow with external talent and technology in areas they find difficult to develop with their own internal dynamics or where they lag in terms of time. This situation creates a golden handcuff opportunity for the entrepreneur. Instead of facing a competitor with a massive budget, coming under their wing offers both a safe and profitable harbor.”

According to Ekinci, we must also add global asymmetric warfare and economic uncertainty to this. An entrepreneur in Türkiye, trying to compete with a rival that has received $500 million in fuel from Silicon Valley, also grapples with local and global economic fluctuations simultaneously. Moreover, the “shelf life” of technologies like artificial intelligence is now very short. A revolutionary solution today could lose its value tomorrow, becoming a “standard feature” with a single update from a big tech giant.

In summary, Ekinci emphasizes that early exits in Türkiye are not an “escape”; they are imagination hitting financial limits, a response to corporate talent hunting, and a strategic mastery of timing to avoid being swallowed in an uncertain future. “The entrepreneur chooses to sell while they still can, preparing with the gained capital and experience for their next, bigger battle. There are very concrete and difficult barriers ahead of our ventures. The lack of experience in opening up to global markets, the limited capacity of Türkiye’s technological infrastructure (like data access, high-cost hardware requirements) to support massive scaling, and the low volume of local investment combine to result in early farewells. This is, in a way, a survival reflex of the ecosystem according to its current capacity.”

THESE “LITTLE STORIES” FIX US IN THE STATUS OF A “FEEDER CLUB” IN THE GLOBAL LEAGUE

According to Ekinci’s sharing, we must also put this reality on the table… Small exits do not increase the ecosystem’s specific weight. Dozens of small-scale exits, unfortunately, do not whet the appetite of global giants for Türkiye, nor do they get us on the radar of large foreign funds. On the contrary, these “little stories” fix us in the status of a “feeder club” in the global league. Emphasizing that these seemingly successful exits have a very low potential to transform into a major center of attraction that strengthens the ecosystem in the long run, Ekinci concludes her words as follows:

“Consequently; the early exits we see today may be lifelines that keep us alive and keep the wheels turning; but they cannot yet create that big breakthrough that will change the total weight of the ecosystem on a global scale and make foreign investors rush here. Real success lies in a future where some structures, against this momentary dynamic, overcome those barriers and continue to stay at the table. There is also the risk of an ecosystem memory that never accumulates. The heaviest cost of early exits is the inability to form that specific weight I just mentioned. Global capital does not chase small exits. Big funds look for billion-dollar structures with university and ecosystem potential, dominating the market. Our small stories create the perception among foreign investors that ‘Türkiye only produces small-scale stuff,’ causing the main capital to route to other countries. When a venture exits early, the bright minds in that venture often dissolve within the rigid hierarchy of the acquiring large corporation. Whereas, if that venture had stayed at the table, it would have created its own school, trained new leaders, and been a generator feeding the ecosystem, like the example of the ‘PayPal Mafia.’ This flow of experience is cut off by early exit.”